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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Texas courts' continued to address a number of significant
corporate law issues during this Survey period.2 Like last year's
Corporations Survey, Section II of this article presents summaries
of the significant judicial developments. Section II groups the significant
cases into the categories of (a) honoring the corporate form, (b) effects of
the failure to pay franchise taxes, (c) disregarding the corporate form,
and (d) drafting corporate agreements. The Texas legislature was not in
session during this Survey period.
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. HONORING THE CORPORATE FORM
During this Survey period, the Texas courts once again stressed the im-
portance of the corporation as an entity separate and apart from its of-
* Glenn D. West is a Partner in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas. Mr. West expresses special thanks to Kristina L. Page and
Marcello E. Tamez, both associates in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas, for their assistance with this Article.
1. Like last year's Corporations Survey, for the purpose of this article, "Texas courts"
includes decisions by the federal district or bankruptcy courts situated within Texas and by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreting Texas law. Since the
scope of this Article is limited to a survey of Texas corporate law issues, federal cases
focusing purely on federal issues affecting the corporation, or federal or Texas cases dis-
cussing securities law generally, are not addressed.
2. October 1, 1999 through September 30, 2000.
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ficers, directors, shareholders and subsidiaries. Although there were no
remarkable cases, Texas courts reaffirmed that (a) a parent corporation is
generally not liable for the torts of its subsidiary;3 (b) a corporation
wholly owned by a sole individual shareholder is still a corporation sepa-
rate and distinct from its owner and, in the absence of proof of the ele-
ments necessary to disregard the corporate veil,4 the corporation
ordinarily shields its owners and shareholders from personal liability;5 (c)
a corporation cannot be liable for actions that took place prior to its in-
corporation;6 (d) corporate shareholders cannot sue for the wrongs done
to that corporation-rather the corporation itself is the only "person"
who may seek to recover for the wrong done to it;7 and (e) corporations,
although distinct from their officers, can act only through them and can
be held liable for the tortious acts of their officers only where such acts
were made by a "vice principal" or by any other officer acting in the
discharge of such officer's corporate duties.8
B. EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO PAY FRANCHISE TAXES (IN RE
ABZ INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.)
Texas corporations and foreign corporations doing business in Texas
are required to file reports with the Texas Comptroller and pay franchise
3. Wayne v. The Dallas Morning News, 78 F. Supp. 2d 571 (N.D. Tex. 1999). Simi-
larly, a position taken by a parent corporation in litigation cannot judicially estop its sub-
sidiary unless the subsidiary itself was a party to the prior action. General Agents Ins. Co.
v. Home Ins. Co., 21 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet. h.).
4. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
5. In the Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet. h.).
The United States Supreme Court also addressed this issue briefly during this Survey pe-
riod in Nelson v. Adams, 120 S. Ct. 1579, 1586 (2000) ("One-person corporations are au-
thorized by law and should not lightly be labeled sham.").
6. Quanaim v. Frasco Rest. & Catering, 17 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
7. Brock v. Baskin-Robbins USA Co., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (E.D. Tex. 2000). Inter-
estingly, however, the shareholders of a corporation are the equitable owners of the corpo-
ration's assets, and as long as the corporation's creditors are not harmed, shareholders
collectively may deal with the corporation's property themselves, and can bind the corpo-
ration by executing an agreement on the corporation's behalf, even though the corporation
itself is not a signatory. Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 12 S.W.3d 120 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet. h.).
8. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lane, 2000 WL 867594 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000,
no pet. h.). A "vice principal" of a corporation "is a corporate officer, a person with au-
thority to employ, direct, and discharge servants of the master, or a person with whom the
master has confided the management of the whole or part of a department or division of
the business." Id. at 288. Moreover, in order to recover exemplary damages against a
corporation for the acts of one of its agents, "there must be a showing that someone em-
ployed in a managerial capacity and acting in the scope of that managerial capacity was
grossly negligent." lanni v. Loram Maint. of Way, Inc., 16 S.W.3d 508, 525 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 2000, pet. denied) (citing Dalworth Trucking Co. v. Bulen, 924 S.W.2d 728, 732-33
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ)). Similarly, an officer, agent or other employee
of a corporation "may be personally as responsible as the corporation itself for tortious
acts when participating in the wrongdoing." Fairmont Travel, Inc. v. George May Int'l Co.,
75 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (citing Mayflower Inv. Co. v. Stephens, 345 S.W.2d
786, 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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taxes.9 A corporation that fails to file a franchise tax report or to pay its
assessed franchise taxes is subject to having the Comptroller forfeit the
corporation's privileges. 10 Forfeiture of corporate privileges results in the
corporation being denied the right to sue or defend in a court of this state
and each corporate director or officer being held liable for the debts of
the corporation as provided in section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code.11
Following the forfeiture of its corporate privileges by the Comptroller,
the Secretary of State may then actually forfeit the corporation's char-
ter.12 The forfeiture of a corporation's charter causes such corporation to
be a "dissolved corporation" pursuant to the Texas Business Corporation
Act. 13
As has been repeatedly stated by Texas courts, including during the
course of this Survey period, 14 neither the forfeiture of corporate privi-
leges by the Comptroller nor the forfeiture of a corporation's charter by
the Secretary of State extinguishes the corporation as an entity.1 5 Fur-
thermore, if a corporation files its delinquent reports and pays its delin-
quent franchise taxes, its corporate privileges and charter are
retroactively reinstated.' 6 While the foregoing rules are clear, an inter-
esting issue arose during the Survey period with respect to the interplay
between (i) the effect of a forfeiture of the corporation's charter by the
Secretary of State under the Texas Tax Code and (ii) the Texas three-year
9. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.001 (Vernon Supp. 2000) and 171.362 (Vernon 1992)
(requirement to pay tax and penalty for not doing so); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.204
(Vernon Supp. 2000) and 171.205 (Vernon 1992) (requirement to file reports with the state
comptroller).
10. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.251 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
11. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.252 (Vernon Supp. 2000). Section 171.255 of the
Texas Tax Code provides: "(a) If the corporate privileges of a corporation are forfeited for
the failure to file a report or pay a tax or penalty, each director or officer of the corpora-
tion is liable for each debt of the corporation that is created or incurred in this state after
the date on which the report, tax, or penalty is due and before the corporate privileges are
revived. The liability includes liability for any tax or penalty imposed by this chapter on
the corporation that becomes due and payable after the date of the forfeiture. (b) The
liability of a director or officer is in the same manner and to the same extent as if the
director or officer were a partner and the corporation were a partnership. (c) A director or
officer is not liable for a debt of the corporation if the director or officer shows that the
debt was created or incurred: (1) over the director's objection; or (2) without the director's
knowledge, and that the exercise of reasonable diligence to become acquainted with the
affairs of the corporation would not have revealed the intention to create the debt. (d) If a
corporation's charter or certificate of authority and its corporate privileges are forfeited
and revived under this chapter, the liability under this section of a director or officer of the
corporation is not affected by the revival of the charter or certificate and the corporate
privileges." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
12. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.309 (Vernon 1992); TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN., art.
7.01 § B(1) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
13. TEX. Bus. CORP. Act ANN., art. 7.12 § F(1)(e) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
14. See, e.g., Mello v. A.M.F. Inc., 7 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, pet.
denied).
15. Lighthouse Church of Cloverleaf v. Texas Bank, 889 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
16. Mello, 7 S.W.3d at 331. Note, however, that the liability of officers and directors of
the corporation for debts incurred during the period of such forfeiture remains. TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 171.255(d) (Vernon 1992).
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survival statute applicable to "dissolved corporations" pursuant to the
Texas Business Corporation Act.
In Re ABZ Insurance Services, Inc. involved a motion to dismiss a
bankruptcy case and a pending adversary proceeding of a Chapter 7
debtor based on the debtor's forfeiture of its corporate charter for failure
to pay franchise taxes. 17 The debtor in ABZ filed its bankruptcy petition
on October 21, 1997, six days after its corporate privileges had been for-
feited by the Comptroller pursuant to the Texas Tax Code, but before the
Secretary of State forfeited the corporation's charter. 18 The Secretary of
State did not forfeit the debtor's charter until February 18, 1998.19
In the motion considered by the court, the movant argued that (1) once
the Secretary of State forfeited the debtor's charter, it was no longer an
eligible "person" under the Bankruptcy Code, thereby requiring that the
bankruptcy case and all adversary proceedings to be dismissed; and (2) in
any event, when the Comptroller forfeited the debtor's corporate privi-
leges under the Texas Tax Code, the debtor was barred from bringing any
proceeding in any court of the State of Texas, including the bankruptcy
court.
20
Interestingly, the court agreed with the proposition that a corporation
whose corporate privileges have been forfeited by the Comptroller is
barred from participating in court proceedings, including obtaining relief
in federal bankruptcy courts situated in Texas, noting that the term "court
of this state" as used in the Texas Tax Code had previously been inter-
preted by a federal court to apply to both Texas state and federal courts.21
The court further found that the debtor corporation in this case had in
fact forfeited its privileges of suing and defending in a "court of this
state" on October 15, 1997, which as previously stated, occurred six days
prior to the date the corporation filed for protection under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.22 Nevertheless, the court determined that when the Secre-
tary of State forfeited the debtor's charter on February 18, 1998, the
forfeiture "revived" the debtor's right to sue and defend in Texas courts
for the purpose of liquidating and distributing its assets as a "dissolved
corporation," pursuant to the three year limited survival statute under the
Texas Business Corporation Act. 23
A bankruptcy filing made within the three-year period following a cor-
poration's dissolution due to charter forfeiture for failing to pay franchise
taxes, and any attendant adversary proceedings necessary to (i) collect its
assets, (ii) pay or satisfy its debts and (iii) liquidate its business, does in-
deed appear to be within the purview of the actions permitted and is
17. 245 B.R. 255 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
18. Id. at 257
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 261 n.2 (citing Farris v. Sambos' Rests., Inc., 498 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Tex.
1980)).
22. Id.
23. ABZ, 245 B.R. at 261 n.2.
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clearly necessary for a dissolved corporation to undertake during its three
year survival period, as provided by the Texas Business Corporation
Act.2 4 It is unclear from the decision, however, what result would have
ensued if the motion had instead been filed immediately after the bank-
ruptcy petition was filed, which would have occurred 6 days after the
Comptroller forfeited the debtor's corporate privileges, including its right
to sue and defend in the courts of the state, but before the Secretary of
State formally forfeited the corporation's charter.25 According to the
reasoning of the court, the corporate debtor could not have properly filed
the petition or adversary actions during that period. This is because a
corporation whose corporate privileges have been forfeited is not in fact a
"dissolved corporation" with revived rights to sue and defend under the
Texas Business Corporation Act. Rather, the corporation is denied such
privileges under the Texas Tax Code.2 6 By happenstance of timing of the
Secretary of State's forfeiture of the charter and the ensuing revival of
the debtor's ability to undertake dissolution, this debtor got lucky. Had
the creditor raised this issue earlier (within the four-month period before
the Secretary of State forfeited the debtor's charter), it may well have
prevailed. 27 Similarly, had the Secretary of State not forfeited the
debtor's charter following the Comptroller's forfeiture of the debtor's
corporate privileges, the creditor likewise would have prevailed.
2 8
24. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN., art. 6.04 (Vernon Supp. 2000); TEX. Bus. CORP.
Acr ANN., art. 7.12. Indeed, the corporation, at any time during the liquidation of its
business and affairs, may make application to any district court of this State in the county
in which the registered office of the corporation is situated to have the liquidation contin-
ued under the supervision of such court as provided by the Act.
25. See ABZ, 245 B.R. at 257. The court intimates that the corporation would not
have been left without redress during this period between forfeiture of privileges and for-
feiture of charter. because its shareholders could act in a representative capacity. The
Bankruptcy Code does not provide, however, for a "representative" filing on behalf of a
corporation.
26. See id. at 261. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.302 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
27. A bankruptcy court addressing this issue could be faced with some interesting
choices. For example, if the court dismisses the case, can the former debtor simply pay the
overdue franchise taxes and then become eligible to file a bankruptcy petition? Can the
new eligible debtor then sue to recover the tax payment as a preferential payment? What
if the motion to dismiss is brought by a creditor who received a substantial preferential
payment and, if the case is dismissed, the creditor will be beyond the preference reach-
back period if the case is later recommenced? Should the bankruptcy court rely on techni-
calities and cause the debtor's estate to lose a potential source of recovery; or might the
court find a way to keep the debtor in bankruptcy, by allowing, for example, the debtor to
pay its prepetition franchise tax above and ahead of the debtor's prepetition creditors?
Thus, under particular facts and circumstances this issue can have ramifications far beyond
intellectual curiosity.
28. The text of section 171.309 seems to not require the Secretary of State to forfeit a
charter after 120 days. The Secretary of State "may forfeit" the charter if the conditions in
the statute are met. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.309 (Vernon 1992). This language con-
trasts with the language of section 171.302, which requires ("the comptroller shall certify")
the Comptroller to certify the name of the corporation to the Attorney General and Secre-
tary of State after the 120th day that the corporate privileges are forfeited. TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 171.302 (Vernon 1992). Thus, a corporation would theoretically be kept in
the "purgatory" of forfeited privileges, but not be dissolved and thereby not be in a posi-
tion to be bankrupt.
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C. DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE FORM (TEXAS-OHIO GAS, INC.
V. MEACOM III)
During the last Survey period, this Corporations Survey noted the gen-
eral reluctance by most Texas courts to disregard the corporate form, or
to otherwise impose personal liability on officers, directors, and share-
holders of corporations, without significant justification for doing so,29
pursuant to the factors set forth in the cornerstone case of Castleberry v.
Branscum.30 Each of the cases discussed in last year's Corporations Sur-
vey, however, involved efforts by a plaintiff to impose personal liability
on the shareholders of a corporation for personal injuries sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the actions of such corporation.31
Among the various decisions handed down by the Texas courts during
this Survey period, Texas-Ohio Gas, Inc. v. Mecom I13 2 is significant be-
cause it provides an opportunity to distinguish between the judicial treat-
ment of cases in which personal shareholder liability is sought as a result
of a tort committed by a corporation unrelated to a contractual obliga-
tion, and cases where personal liability is sought as a result of a contrac-
tual obligation of the corporation, regardless of whether liability is based
on the contract or some alleged tort related to such contract. 33 In the
latter situation, the Castleberry common law alter ego theories have been
superseded by Texas' Shareholder Protection Act, Article 2.21(A)(2) of
the Texas Business Corporation Act.34
Article 2.21(A) of the Texas Business Corporation Act provides in per-
tinent part:
A. A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares,
or a subscriber for shares whose subscription has been accepted, or
any affiliate thereof or of the corporation, shall be under no obliga-
tion to the corporation or its obligees with respect to:
(2) any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter relat-
ing to or arising from the obligation on the basis that the holder,
owner, subscriber, or affiliate is or was the alter ego of the corpora-
tion, or on the basis of actual fraud or constructive fraud, a sham to
perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory, unless the obligee dem-
29. Glenn D. West & Christopher M. Fairman, Corporations, 53 SMU L. REv. 773,
775 (Summer 2000).
30. See Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272. Under Castleberry, the "alter ego" factors are:
"(1) when the [corporate] fiction is used as a means of perpetrating fraud; (2) where a
corporation is organized and operated as a mere tool or business conduit of another corpo-
ration; (3) where the corporate fiction is resorted to as a means of evading an existing legal
obligation; (4) where the corporate fiction is employed to achieve or perpetrate a monop-
oly; (5) where the corporate fiction is used to circumvent a statute; and (6) where the
corporate fiction is relied upon as a protection of a crime or to justify a wrong."
31. West & Fairman, supra note 29, at 775-78.
32. 28 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet. h.).
33. See also, Harco Energy, Inc. v. The Re-Entry People, Inc., 23 S.W.3d 389, 395-97
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).




onstrates that the holder, owner, subscriber, or affiliate caused the
corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did per-
petrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct per-
sonal benefit of the holder, owner, subscriber, or affiliate; or
(3) any obligation of the corporation on the basis of the failure of
the corporation to observe any corporate formality, including with-
out limitation: (a) the failure to comply with any requirement of this
Act or of the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation;
or (b) the failure to observe any requirement prescribed by this Act
or by the articles of incorporation or bylaws for acts to be taken by
the corporation, its board of directors, or its shareholders. 35
Furthermore, Article 2.21(B) of the Texas Business Corporation Act
provides that the limitation of liability of shareholders, owners, subscrib-
ers and affiliates set forth in Section A is "exclusive and preempts any
other liability imposed on a holder, owner, or subscriber of shares of a
corporation or any affiliate thereof or of the corporation for that obliga-
tion under common law or otherwise," except where there is an express
guarantee or assumption of liability by such person or some other statute
imposes such liability.36
The effect of Article 2.21 on tort cases involving alter ego allegations
has been to simply remove, by virtue of Clause (3) of Article 2.21(A), the
failure to observe corporate formalities as a factor in finding an alter ego
to exist.37 Clause (2) of Article 2.21(A), however, appears to have been
clearly intended, in cases involving the contractual obligations of a corpo-
ration, to eliminate the ability of parties to such contract to make claims
of alter ego, even for fraud or other tort claims arising out of a contrac-
tual dispute, unless the claimant can demonstrate that the contracting
corporation was used to perpetrate an actual fraud on the claimant "pri-
marily" for the "direct personal" benefit of the shareholder or other indi-
vidual upon whom personal liability is sought to be imposed.38
Texas-Ohio Gas involved a plaintiff who sought to recover from share-
holders and employees of a corporation for the contractual debts of the
corporation. 39 The plaintiff's claims included negligent misrepresenta-
tion, fraud, fraudulent inducement, and tortious interference with a con-
tract, based on alleged contractual misrepresentations in which the
35. Id.
36. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.21 §(B) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
37. See, e.g., Hall v. Timmons, 987 S.W.2d 248, 250 n.2 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999,
no pet.); see also Aluminum Chems. (Bol.), Inc. v. Bechtel Corp., 28 S.W.3d 64, 67 n.3 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.). However, it has also been stated during this Survey pe-
riod regarding Article 2.21, perhaps incorrectly, that "[a]lthough there is some collegial
disagreement about its intent, the cited amendments to the Texas Business Corporation
Act removed the traditional distinction between the application of alter ego in a contract
and a tort context. The result is that fraud must now be shown before a plaintiff may
recover in either situation." Aluminum Chems., 28 S.W.3d at 68 n.4.
38. See Menetti v. Chavers, 974 S.W.2d 168, 174 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no
pet.).




plaintiff agreed to sell natural gas to the corporation on credit. 40 At the
center of the plaintiff's claims was the defendants' alleged misrepresenta-
tion to the plaintiff that the corporate entity entering into the contract
with the plaintiff had "merged" with a "stronger" corporation when, in
fact, the defendants' corporation had become a lower-tier subsidiary of
that stronger parent entity.41
Apparently, the plaintiff had previously sold natural gas to another
company owned and operated by the defendants, GM Hydrocarbons. 42
The defendants sold GM Hydrocarbons to Olympic Energy Corporation
("OEC") in a transaction pursuant to which OEC assumed the contrac-
tual obligations of GM Hydrocarbons, but GM Hydrocarbons operated
as a wholly owned division or subsidiary of OEC and continued to do
business in its own name. 43 OEC also controlled another indirect and
wholly-owned subsidiary, Olympic Gas Marketing ("OGM"). 44 OGM
was a corporation with $1,000 in capital and all of its other assets were
encumbered. 45 The false representation complained of by Texas-Ohio
was that the defendants, in order to induce Texas-Ohio to sell gas to
OGM and other OEC related entities on the same credit terms previously
enjoyed by GM Hydrocarbons, misrepresented to Texas-Ohio that GM
Hydrocarbons had been merged with OGM. Thus, Texas-Ohio was led to
believe that in doing business directly with OGM, they were actually do-
ing business with a "newer and larger corporation. '46 OGM and its re-
lated entities subsequently purchased over $1 million in natural gas, failed
to pay for it, and were placed in bankruptcy. 47
Based on the pleadings, the trial court dismissed all of the plaintiff's
claims without specifying the nature of, or grounds for, the dismissal. 48
On appeal, the issue was whether there were any grounds to support the
dismissal. 49 The defendants argued that the dismissal was proper either
as (a) a Rule 13 sanction for filing groundless claims in bad faith or for
the purpose of harassment, (b) a failure to state a claim, or (c) a no evi-
dence summary judgment.50 Thus, at the heart of the appellate court's
review was whether a claim against the individual defendants for the con-
40. Id. at 133-34. Texas-Ohio's claims were generally based on its allegation that the
defendants participated individually and as co-conspirators in a fraudulent scheme that
induced Texas-Ohio to sell natural gas to insolvent entities.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. 28 S.W.3d at 133-34.
44. Id. at 134 n.1. Apparently OGM was also the name under which all of the related
Olympic entities did business at the time the alleged misrepresentation was made. Because
OGM was not actually formed as a corporate entity until after the alleged misrepresenta-
tion was made.
45. Texas-Ohio Gas, 28 S.W.3d at 134 n.2.
46. Id. at 133.
47. Id. at 134.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Unfortunately, the court of appeals determined that the defendant's motion
could not be construed as a no evidence summary judgment. Id. at 142.
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tractual debts of OGM to Texas-Ohio was legally supportable under
Texas law.
The appellate court reviewed the plaintiff's allegations and the defend-
ants' contention that the plaintiff's "entire action [was] a groundless at-
tempt to extend corporate debt liabilities to individuals" in violation of
Article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corporation Act.51 The appellate
court found that "all of Texas-Ohio's claims [were] attempting to hold
shareholders personally liable for a matter relating to or arising from a
contractual obligation of the corporation. '52 Consequently, the court
correctly invoked the exclusivity of Article 2.21 as the only means of im-
posing shareholder liability with respect to the claims alleged by the
plaintiff.53 In applying Article 2.21, the court held that the plaintiff's
claim alleging negligent misrepresentation was "groundless," because it
lacked the element of actual fraud required by Article 2.21.54
With respect to the remaining claims for fraud, fraudulent inducement,
and tortious interference with a contract, however, the court reached a
different conclusion, determining that such claims were not groundless
under the shareholder liability provisions of Article 2.21.55 Specifically,
the court noted that while the plaintiff did not allege personal fraud by
the defendants, the plaintiff's claims were nevertheless based upon the
defendants' alleged participation in a fraudulent conspiracy to induce
Texas-Ohio to sell natural gas to a company that the defendants knew to
be insolvent.56 Thus, despite the court's acknowledgment that the de-
fendants' actions were on behalf of the corporate entities that employed
them, and notwithstanding the further acknowledgment of the general
rule that corporate agents or employees acting within the scope of their
employment or agency relationship cannot, as a matter of law, form a
conspiracy, the court held that "corporate agents can conspire with one
another even if they are purportedly acting as employees of the corpora-
tion, if they are in fact acting primarily for their own personal benefit. ' 57
According to the court, it was irrelevant that the plaintiff's petition did
not allege that the fraud committed by the defendants through this con-
spiracy was for the personal benefit of the defendants, as required by
Article 2.21.58 Such failure simply amounted to a defect in the petition,
which should have been remedied through special exceptions. 59 As such,
the court noted that Article 2.21 does not bar shareholder liability in
cases of actual fraud for personal gain. The court therefore concluded
that all of the plaintiff's claims, with the exception of negligent misrepre-
sentation, were not groundless, and there was no proper basis for the trial
51. Texas-Ohio Gas, 28 S.W.3d at 136.
52. Id. at 137.
53. Id. at 137-38.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 138.
56. Id. at 134.
57. Texas-Ohio Gas, 28 S.W.3d at 138 n.10.




court's dismissal of those claims.60
Texas-Ohio Gas is a disturbing decision. Despite the apparent clarity
of Article 2.21 and the fundamental notion that parties to a contract have
an opportunity to bargain for guarantees from parent companies, affili-
ates, or shareholders, should such assurances be desired, the court has
effectively allowed a party to a contract that expressly names a specific
corporation as the obligor, to obtain an unbargained-for guarantee from
the corporation's shareholders to the extent that a jury finds that a "rep-
resentation" was made on behalf of the corporation that the contracting
corporation had "merged" with another corporation. This decision does
a serious disservice to the sanctity of the corporate entity and to the prin-
ciples enunciated in Part of A of Section II. If the Texas-Ohio Gas deci-
sion correctly states Texas law, piercing the corporate veil has effectively
become a simple exercise in pleading fraudulent inducement, even if the
plaintiff contracted solely with a corporate entity acting through its au-
thorized officer, and the corporation's shareholders did not contractually
assume the obligation. This result is directly contrary to the Texas courts'
repeated condemnation of concocted tort claims arising from a clearly
contractual arrangement. 61 Furthermore, the court's decision diverges
from Article 2.21 and the Texas legislature's clear mandate that piercing
the corporate veil in contract cases (including tort claims arising out of
such contracts) requires the corporation to have been used to perpetuate
an "actual fraud primarily" for the "direct personal benefit" of the per-
sons upon whom personal liability is sought to be imposed. Apparently
there were no allegations in Texas-Ohio Gas that the defendants "prima-
rily" and "directly" benefited from the purchase of the gas by OGM. If
the primary beneficiary is the corporation, indirect benefits to a share-
holder (such as those obtained by being an employee or shareholder of
the benefited corporation) or even direct benefits to a shareholder, are
not sufficient under Article 2.21 to impose liability. Therefore, this au-
thor does not believe Texas-Ohio Gas was decided correctly. 62
D. DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS
As discussed in last year's Corporations Survey, drafting agreements
with corporate entities presents unique issues not present in dealing with
individuals or other entities. As noted in the discussion of Texas-Ohio in
60. Id. at 139.
61. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1991); Jim
Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1986).
62. Perhaps the case would have been decided correctly if the defendants had filed a
no-evidence summary judgment motion because it is difficult to conceive of the "facts" that
would have demonstrated a "direct" and primary benefit to the defendants from gas being
sold to OGM on credit terms previously enjoyed by their prior company. In another case
decided during this Survey period, the court looked solely to Castleberry and failed to note
the exclusivity of Article 2.21 as the sole means if imposing liability on shareholders of a
corporation with respect to a contractual obligation of that corporation (in this case an
insurance policy). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. AIG Technical Servs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d
787 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
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Part C of this Section, even clear drafting specifically naming the corpora-
tion as the only party to an agreement is not a guarantee that a plaintiff
will not attempt to rewrite the agreement to add parties thereto. Careful
drafting can, however, eliminate most of those attempts. During the Sur-
vey period, Texas courts confronted (1) a case involving the failure to
clearly draft a document with a corporate entity in mind, as opposed to
an individual, and the effect of such lack of clarity on the individual in-
volved; (2) a case involving the binding nature of a letter of intent con-
taining a provision requiring the parties to negotiate "in good faith" and
specifically stating that the provision was intended to be binding; and (3)
a case addressing whether a successor corporation assumed certain tort
liabilities when its predecessor purchased a corporation's assets.
1. Taylor-Made Hose, Inc. v. Wilkerson63
While it is true that, "an officer of a corporation may assume personal
responsibility for a corporate transaction either by adding his responsibil-
ity to that of his corporate principal, or by tendering his own responsibil-
ity for that of his principal," 64 except in situations where a corporate
officer (who is usually also a significant owner of the corporation) exe-
cutes a specific separate personal guaranty, it is rare that a corporate of-
ficer executing a document on behalf of a corporation intends to become
personally liable therefor. Too often, however, despite the presumed lit-
eracy of most corporate officers, 65 the body of the document or signature
block does not clearly specify the officer's representative capacity. 66
Lynne Wilkerson, a corporate vice-president, found herself a victim of
this common mistake when Taylor-Made Hose, Inc. sought to impose
personal liability on her in connection with a credit application she signed
on behalf of her employer, North American Transit, Inc. The one-page
application, which clearly sought credit information concerning the cor-
porate entity and not that of Wilkerson, contained the following clause in
the terms and conditions: "I, personally agree to pay all invoices and costs
of collection.., on any amount remaining unpaid after 90 days." 67 The
form was then signed as follows:
OFFICER'S NAME: Lynne Wilkerson TITLE: Vice-President
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: /s/ Lynne Wilkerson
DATE: 7-21-94
63. 21 S.W.3d 484 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied).
64. Austin v. Dunnan & Strong, 761 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1988, no writ).
65. One Texas court pointed out during the last Survey period, that even an illiterate
person is held to have known and understood the legal effect of a contract he signed. See
Reyes v. Storage and Processors, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet.
denied).
66. See Mort Keshin & Co. v. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 992 S.W.2d 642, 647
(Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no. pet.).
67. Taylor-Made, 21 S.W.3d at 489.
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Based on the clause quoted above, Taylor-Made sued Wilkerson per-
sonally as the guarantor of North American Transit's debts to Taylor-
Made following North American Transit's discharge in bankruptcy.68 The
trial court rendered a take nothing summary judgment against Taylor-
Made, concluding that Wilkerson had signed the application only in her
representative, and not individual, capacity. 69
On appeal, Taylor-Made argued that the credit application "unambigu-
ously establishes Wilkerson to be a personal guarantor of" the obligations
of the corporate applicant. 70 The San Antonio Court of Appeals agreed
that the credit application was unambiguous, noting that "[b]y agreeing to
'personally ... pay' North America Transit's delinquent account, Wilker-
son made herself personally liable for the corporation's debt."'71
In holding that the credit application was unambiguous, the court ig-
nored the content of the application that clearly requested information
solely for the corporation and instead found an individual obligation in
the phrase "I, personally agree."72 According to this court, apparently a
corporation cannot be an "I" nor can it "personally agree."'73 As a result,
the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the
case for further proceedings consistent with the court of appeals'
opinion.74
A dissenting opinion by Justice Lopez, joined by Chief Justice
Hardberger, disagreed that the application unambiguously made Wilker-
son the guarantor of her employer's debts and warned that the "major-
ity's opinion puts at risk the personal estates of corporate officers and
employees across the State of Texas... [who] can now be lured into per-
sonally guaranteeing the debts of their employer no matter how weakly-
worded and despite the fact that they are signing the document solely in
their official capacity."'75
68. Id. at 487.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 488.
71. Id.
72. For a discussion of the rules governing the admissibility of parol evidence to
demonstrate whether a person signed in a representative or individual capacity see Gary
D. Spivey, Annotation, Admissibility of Parol Evidence to Show Whether Guaranty of Cor-
poration's Obligations was Signed in Officer's Representative or Individual Capacity, 70
A.L.R.3d 1276 (1976); L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Admissibility of Oral or Extrinsic Evidence
on Question of Liability on Bill of Exchange, Promissory Note, or Other Contract Where
Signature is Followed by Word or Abbreviation Which May be Either Descriptive or Indica-
tive of Contracting Character, 113 A.L.R. 1364 (1938).
73. But see TMG Truck Serv., Inc. v. Petty, 313 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.). (Use of the pronoun "I" in the body of the contract with the words
"I, [name of the president] president of [name and address of corporation] agrees to pay",
where the signature block named the corporation and the title of the officer, did not render
the corporation's president who signed the contract personally liable as a matter of law).
74. The decision that the majority appears to have principally relied upon in reaching
its decision, Austin Hardwoods, Inc., v. Vanden Berghe, 917 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.-EI
Paso 1995, writ denied), is clearly distinguishable. In Austin Hardwoods, the credit appli-
cation read: "If a corporation, the undersigned personally guarantees the payment of this
account in his individual capacity." Id. at 323.
75. Taylor-Made, 21 S.W.3d at 495.
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Taylor-Made should be a reminder of the need to caution clients about
signing "standard forms." In addition to insisting that the representative
capacity of an officer is clearly stated, clients should also make certain
that the only obligor in the body of the agreement is the corporate en-
tity76 and remove any "form" language reflecting the personal pronoun
"I" and other similar words such as "personally. '77
2. John Wood Group USA, Inc. v. ICO, Inc.78
In John Wood, the court addressed the common practice among corpo-
rate practitioners of using preliminary letters of intent to outline the basic
terms of a corporate acquisition prior to negotiating the definitive
purchase agreement. Ever since the much criticized decision in Texaco,
Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,7 9 Texas corporate practitioners have been particu-
larly sensitive to ensuring that their letters of intent cannot possibly be
mistaken for binding agreements.
In John Wood, ICO, Inc. ("ICO") sought to purchase the assets of
NDT, a manufacturer of pipe inspection equipment, from NDT's parent
companies, Wood Group Drilling & Production Services, Ltd. and John
Wood Group USA, Inc. (the "Wood Group").80 ICO and the Wood
Group negotiated and entered into a letter agreement outlining the es-
sential terms of the proposed sale.81 The letter agreement contained the
following clause:
15. Binding Effect. This Letter Agreement constitutes a summary of
the principal terms and conditions of the understanding which has
been reached regarding the sale of certain assets to Purchaser (ICO).
It does not address all of the terms and conditions which the parties
must agree upon to become binding and consummated. The Pur-
chaser, however, does intend to move forward with its due diligence
and expects to expend considerable sums to review the Sellers' Busi-
ness. In consideration therefor, the parties have agreed to make cer-
76. If the body of the contract makes clear that the obligation is intended to be that of
the corporation, the form of the signature appears to be less significant. See Robertson v.
Bland, 517 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 1974), writ dism'd); FDIC v.
K-D Leasing Co., 743 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ); See also, D.C. Bar-
rett, Annotation, Person Who Signs Contract But is Not Named in Body Thereof as Party to
Contract and Liable Thereunder, 94 A.L.R.2d 691 (1964).
77. For additional examples of what not to do, see the cases discussed in W.A.E., An-
notation, Personal Liability of Directors as Affected by Terms of Contract or Form of Signa-
ture, 33 A.L.R. 1353 (1924), supplemented 51 A.L.R. 319 (1927). Particular caution should
be used when signing in any name other than the actual name of the corporation. Using an
assumed or trade name may impose personal liability on the officer, even if he clearly
signed in a representative capacity, because his principal (the corporation whose actual
true name was not used) may be undisclosed. See Lachmann v. Houston Chronicle Publ'g
Co., 375 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wolf v. Little John
Corp. of Liberia, 585 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Lassiter v. Rotogravure Comm. Inc., 727 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
78. 26 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
79. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 14.
81. Id. at 15.
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tain covenants of this letter binding upon the parties notwithstanding
the fact that not all details of the transactions have been agreed
upon. Accordingly, it is understood and agreed that this letter is an
expression of the parties' mutual intent and is not binding upon them
except for the provisions of paragraphs (4), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12),
(13), and (14) hereof.82
The binding provisions included an agreement to negotiate in good
faith, a prohibition on third-party negotiations ("no shop") and a confi-
dentiality agreement, as well as some other less important provisions.83
The provisions dealing with the purchase price, conditions for closing, as-
sets to be acquired and terms of issuance of ICO shares were
nonbinding.84
Following the execution of the letter agreement, the negotiations for
the sale of NDT eventually broke down and subsequently (after the end
of the no shop period set forth in the letter agreement), the Wood Group
closed a deal for the sale of NDT with Tuboscope Vetco International, a
competitor of ICO.85 ICO then purchased another manufacturer of pipe
inspection units and sued the Wood Group for breach of the letter agree-
ment to sell NDT.86 After trial, the jury awarded ICO $8.5 million in
actual damages for breach of contract, $2,761,917 in prejudgment interest
and $4,504,766 (40% of ICO's recovery) in attorney's fees, plus post judg-
ment interests and costs. 87
On appeal, the Wood Group argued that the letter agreement was non-
binding as a matter of law and that the trial court erred by submitting a
question to the jury concerning the breach of that letter agreement. 88
ICO argued that the letter agreement was ambiguous and presented an
issue for the jury on the fact question of whether the parties intended to
be bound by the letter agreement. 89 The court of appeals noted the fa-
miliar rule that, "if a contract is worded so that it can be given a certain or
definite legal meaning, then it is not ambiguous, and ... a trial court errs
when it submits the question of the parties' intent to the jury."90
In determining whether the letter agreement was unambiguously bind-
ing on the parties, the court first considered Foreca v. GRD Development
Co.91 In Foreca, the parties had entered into an agreement that stated it
was "subject to legal documentation. '92 The Foreca court held that mak-
ing an agreement "subject to legal documentation" did not unambigu-
ously state an intention not to be bound to the agreement. 93 According




86. John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 15-16.




91. 758 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. 1988).
92. John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 16 (quoting Foreca).
93. Id. at 16-17.
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to the court in John Wood, the phrase "subject to legal documentation"
could either be a reference to a condition to the formation of a future
contract or it could refer to a future memorial to an already existing con-
tract.94 As a result, it was understandable that the Foreca court found
ambiguity and submitted the issue to a jury.95 However, the John Wood
court noted that in the case sub judice, the letter agreement expressly
stated that it was "not binding," except for "certain enumerated
paragraphs. ' 96 Thus, the John Wood court distinguished Foreca based on
the difference in the language used.
The John Wood court next considered Murphy v. Seabarge, Ltd.97 In
Murphy, the agreement, like the agreement in John Wood, expressly pro-
vided that it was "not intended to be a binding contract. ' 98 The John
Wood court noted, however, that the Murphy court found that the par-
ties' actions after the agreement was entered into raised a fact issue as to
the parties' intent to be bound.99 In Murphy, despite the express state-
ment denying any intent to be bound, the plaintiff began performing
under the agreement by paying himself a management fee and thereby
creating a fact issue as to the parties' intent to be bound.100 In John
Wood, on the other hand, there was no issue of "partial performance"
and, indeed, "it is the complete lack of performance that gave rise to this
lawsuit."101
The John Wood court next reviewed Coastal Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield
Co.10 2 ("Coastal Corp.") and RHS Interests, Inc. v. 2727 Kirby Ltd.103
("RHS Interests"), and found the facts in these cases more similar to the
facts in John Wood, than those in Foreca or Murphy.10 4
In Coastal Corp., the parties prepared (but never signed) an agreement
providing that "nothing in this Agreement shall be binding upon any of
the parties until this Agreement is executed by all of the parties by their
duly authorized officers. ' 10 5 Thus, the Coastal Corp. court held that be-
cause the document memorializing the parties' agreement expressly re-
quired that it be executed to be binding, and because the parties in fact
never executed the agreement, no contract existed.10 6
94. Id. at 17.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 868 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
98. John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 17 (citing Murphy, 868 S.W.2d at 933).
99. Id. (citing Murphy, 868 S.W.2d at 933).
100. Murphy, 868 S.W.2d at 938.
101. John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 17.
102. 852 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
103. 994 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
104. See John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 18.
105. Id. at 17 (citing Coastal Corp., 852 S.W.2d at 717).
106. 852 S.W.2d at 717. While the letter agreement in Coastal Corp. involved an agree-
ment to sell stock at a time when the statute of frauds applied to such agreements, section
8.113 of the current Texas Business and Commerce Code makes clear that the statute of
frauds does not apply to the sale or purchase of a security. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 8.113 (West 2000). See also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (West 2000)
(codifying the statute of frauds). Since technically an oral agreement would be sufficient to
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In RHS Interests, the parties entered into a letter agreement that pro-
vided "[t]his offer is a summary of a transaction to be fully described in
an Earnest Money Contract ... This letter serves only as an offer.., and
is not binding as an agreement unless and until a fully executed Earnest
Money Contract is signed. ' 10 7 The Earnest Money Contract was never
executed. The RHS Interests court held that there was no binding con-
tract because "[a] deal would be consummated only by 'the execution of
the binding Purchase and Sale Agreement."'1 0 8
While acknowledging that "a binding contract may be formed if the
parties agree on the material terms, even though they leave open other
provisions for later negotiation," 109 and that "a letter of intent may be
binding even though it refers to the drafting of a future, more formal
agreement," 110 the John Wood court held that the letter agreement in
question clearly and unequivocally expressed the parties' intent not to be
bound."'
Although the court clearly reached the correct result, it is disturbing
that the court found it necessary to engage in so much analysis over what
would appear to a corporate practitioner to be patently obvious in this
case, i.e., as the court finally declares, "not binding in this case means
exactly that, not binding."'1 12
In addition to considering ICO's claim that the letter agreement was a
binding agreement of sale and purchase, the John Wood court also con-
sidered ICO's claim that the good faith negotiation clause, which was ex-
pressly binding on the parties pursuant to the terms of the letter
agreement, was breached. 113 The good faith negotiation clause provided:
"Each of the Sellers and the Purchaser shall cooperate and work in good
faith and do all acts and things as the other party may, either before or
after the Closing Date, reasonably require to effectively carry out or bet-
ter evidence or perfect the full intent and meaning of this Letter
effect a sale of securities, it makes sense to include a provision like that of Coastal Corp. in
drafts of stock purchase agreements in order to avoid a claim that the parties have a bind-
ing oral agreement that the unsigned draft agreement memorializes.
107. John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 17 (citing RHS Interests, 994 S.W.2d at 897).
108. Id. at 17-18 (citing RHS Interests, 994 S.W.2d at 897). The John Wood court also
discussed two cases from other jurisdictions on the issue of whether the use of the term
"not binding" is ambiguous. See Feldman v. Allegany Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1219 (7th
Cir. 1988) (holding was a contract clearly not binding where a provision stated that the
parties "understood that this is not a binding agreement and the obligations and rights of
the parties shall be set forth in the definitive agreement executed by the parties"); Arca-
dian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding references
in letter of intent to the fact that negotiations might fail and that the binding agreement
was to be completed at a future date, conclusively established that the parties did not
intend to be bound by letter of intent).
109. John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 19 (citing Scott v. Ingle Bros. Pac., Inc., 489 S.W.2d 554,
555 (Tex. 1972)).
110. Id. at 19 (citing Foreca, 758 S.W.2d at 746).






ICO claimed that the damages awarded by the jury for breach of con-
tract were the same measure of damages that should be awarded for the
failure of the Wood Group to enter into the definitive agreement it had
agreed to negotiate in good faith.1 5 Citing the 7th Circuit's decision in
Venture Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp.,116 ICO sought to
use the language in Venture Associates to show that but for the Wood
Group's "bad faith, the parties would have made a final contract." '" 7
Thus, the "damages for a breach of an agreement to negotiate [are]...
the same as the damages for breach of the final contract that the parties
would have signed had it not been for the defendant's bad faith."' " 8
The John Wood court declined to rely on Venture Associates, however,
because it was based on Illinois law and not Texas law. 119 According to
the John Wood court, under Illinois law, an agreement to negotiate to-
ward the formation of a contract is an enforceable obligation, whereas
"under Texas law an agreement to negotiate in the future is unenforce-
able, even if the agreement calls for a 'good faith effort' in the negotia-
tions.' 20 Furthermore, the John Wood court found this particular good
faith negotiation clause "too vague to be enforceable as a contractual ob-
ligation.' 21 Citing the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Northern Nat-
ural Gas Co. v. Conoco, Inc.,122 the John Wood court held that in order
for a breach of a good faith provision to give rise to damages, it must be
tied to another binding obligation created by the letter agreement. 23
114. Id. at 20 n.3. Clearly the reference to "before or after the Closing Date," is bizarre
language for a nonbinding letter of intent contemplating a definitive document to super-
sede it.
115. John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 20-21.
116. 96 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 1996).
117. Id. at 278.
118. John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 21 (quoting Venture Assoc., 96 F.3d at 278).
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Radford v. McNeny, 104 S.W.2d 472, 474-75 (Tex. 1937); Maranatha
Temple, Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 893 S.W.2d 92, 104 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1994,
writ denied)).
121. Id. at 21 (citing Richter v. Bank of Am. Nat'l!Trust and Sav. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 1176
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that agreement by bank to negotiate in good faith toward a reason-
able restructure of the plaintiff's debt was too indefinite to enforce)).
122. 986 S.W.2d 603, 606-07 (Tex. 1998). In Northern Natural Gas, the Texas Supreme
Court held that the obligation of good faith imposed on agreements covered by the Uni-
form Commercial Code pursuant to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE section 1.203, "does not
support an independent cause of action for the failure to perform or enforce in good faith."
Id. at 606.
123. John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 22. Other states differ on whether good faith clauses in
letters of intent are treated as binding. Like Texas law, Massachusetts law does not treat
good faith clauses in letters of intent as binding on the parties where the letter of intent
specifically states that it is not intended to create any binding legal obligation. See Schwan-
beck v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 412 Mass. 703 (1992); Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston
Redev. Auth., 427 Mass. 509 (1998); Rosenfield v. U.S. Trust Co., 195 N.E. 323 (Mass.
1935). Under Illinois law, a good faith clause in a letter of intent can be binding on the
parties if the parties intended to be legally bound. See Venture Assocs. Corp., 96 F.3d 275,
277 (7th Cir. 1996). Similarly, under New York law, parties may use letters of intent and
good faith clauses to bind themselves if the parties intend to be bound. See Adjustrite Sys.,
Inc. v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 145 F.3d 543 (2d Cir. 1998).
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Finally, ICO argued that the jury's damage award could also be sup-
ported on the basis of a breach by the John Wood Group of the no shop
and confidentiality provisions in the letter agreement. 124 Apparently,
John Wood had continued to negotiate with the party to whom it eventu-
ally sold NDT, even though it waited until after the no shop provision
expired to actually enter into a transaction with this party.125 The John
Wood court held, however, that the breach of these provisions would not
support the "benefit of the bargain damages" awarded by the jury. 126
The court also held that the liquidated damages award specifically pro-
vided for in the letter agreement for a breach of the no shop provision
could not be sustained as it was impossible to tell whether the jury
awarded the liquidated damages as a result of the breach of the nonbind-
ing agreement or as a result of a breach of these provisions which were
binding) 27 Therefore, the court remanded ICO's claim for breach of the
no shop and confidentiality provisions and the liquidated damages award
to the trial court for further proceedings. 28
3. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon129
Lockheed involved the often heavily negotiated issue of which liabili-
ties a purchaser agrees to assume in an asset acquisition agreement in-
volving a sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a selling
corporation. In Lockheed, workers exposed to silica and silica-containing
dust sued for personal injuries resulting therefrom.13 0 One of the original
defendants was Wedron Silica Company, the alleged supplier of the silica
compounds to the foundries at which the workers had been exposed.13'
Wedron had sold all of its assets in 1979 to Martin-Marietta Corporation
pursuant to an asset purchase agreement. 132 Lockheed Martin thereafter
became a successor-in-interest to Martin-Marietta Corporation, presuma-
bly as the result of a merger of Martin-Marietta into Lockheed Corpora-
tion.133 Lockheed Martin had filed a motion for summary judgment in
the trial court based on the 1979 asset purchase agreement between We-
dron and Martin-Marietta, arguing that Martin-Marietta had neither ex-
pressly nor impliedly assumed liability for Wedron's contingent torts in
124. John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 22-23.
125. Id. at 14-15.
126. Id. at 23.
127. Id.
128. See id. ICO also claimed it was entitled to damages based on it fraudulent induce-
ment claim. ICO claimed in effect that it had been fraudulently induced to enter into the
letter agreement on the Wood Group's false representation that it would sell NDT for
book value, when in fact the Wood Group was intending to extract a higher price. The
court quickly dismissed this claim because it was based on the assumption that ICO had in
fact entered into a binding contract. If there was no binding agreement, ICO could not
have been fraudulently induced to enter into it. Id. at 24.
129. 16 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
130. Id. at 130.
131. Id. at 130-31.




the 1979 agreement, and that in the absence of such a contractual as-
sumption, Martin-Marietta, and therefore Lockheed Martin, had no suc-
cessor liability as the purchaser of assets from Wedron.134 The workers
also moved for summary judgment on the basis that Martin-Marietta had
in fact assumed such liabilities. 135 The trial court had rendered summary
judgment in favor of the workers that Lockheed Martin was "contractu-
ally liable for any damages adjudicated against Wedron Silica Company
of Delaware with respect to [the workers] alleged cause of action." 136
On appeal, the court held that Martin-Marietta (and therefore Lock-
heed Martin) had only assumed "ordinary course of business liabilities
and obligations" under the 1979 agreement, that tort liabilities are not in
the "ordinary course of business," and that, in the absence of an express
or implied assumption of those liabilities in the 1979 agreement, there
was no successor liability imposed on Martin-Marietta (or its successor-
in-interest, Lockheed Martin) as the purchaser of Wedron's assets. 137
There was an interesting choice of law discussion as to whether Dela-
ware, Maryland or Texas law governed the issue. While the court con-
cluded that Delaware law controlled, the court nevertheless proceeded to
demonstrate that the result would be the same regardless of which law
governed. 138 This discussion provides valuable guidance to corporate
practitioners as to the differences between Delaware, Maryland and
Texas law on the issue.
The court began its analysis by referring to the Third Restatement of
the Law of Torts for Products Liability,139 which restates the general rule
that a purchaser of the assets of a business is not subject to the liability
caused by the defective products sold by the seller unless:
(a) in acquiring the assets, the successor agrees to assume liability;
(b) the acquisition results from a fraudulent conveyance to escape
liability for the debts or liabilities of the predecessor;
(c) the acquisition constitutes a consolidation or merger with the
predecessor; or
(d) the acquisition results in the successor becoming a continuation
of the predecessor. 140
The court noted that while both Delaware and Maryland recognize all
four exceptions to the general rule of non-liability, Texas only recognizes
the first two exceptions.141 The court further noted that under the Texas
Business Corporation Act, a "purchase of all or substantially all of the
assets of the seller's corporation does not make the acquiring [entity] re-
sponsible or liable for any liability or obligation of the selling corporation
134. Id. at 130-31.
135. Lockheed, 16 S.W.3d at 131.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 139.
138. Id. at 134 n.4.
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 (1998).
140. Id., as quoted in Lockheed, 16 S.W.3d at 134.
141. Lockheed, 16 S.W.3d at 134 (citing Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, 698 F. Supp. 535, 540
(D. Del. 1988); Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 617, 594 A.2d 564, 565-66 (1991)).
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unless the acquiring entity assumes the liability or the obligation, or un-
less another statute expressly provides to the contrary." 142 According to
the court, Texas had effectively eliminated the third and fourth excep-
tions to the general rule of non-liability for purchasers of all or substan-
tially all of the assets of a selling corporation.143 As far as the court was
concerned, however, the only exception implicated in this case, under ei-
ther Maryland, Delaware or Texas law, was the first one, i.e., the pur-
chaser agrees to assume the liability.1"4  The court observed that in
Delaware and Maryland, the assumption of a contingent liability by a
purchaser of assets from a selling corporation can be either express or
implied, 145 but in Texas the assumption must be express.
146
Turning to the 1979 purchase agreement, the court concluded that
there was no express or implied assumption of the tort liability to the
workers under either Maryland or Delaware law and likewise no express
assumption of such liability under Texas law. 147 The 1979 agreement,
which neither party had claimed was ambiguous, was examined in its en-
tirety to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties as expressed in
the instrument.1 48 In reviewing the entire agreement "to harmonize and
give effect to all of its provisions, so that none will be rendered meaning-
less," the court noted that a number of the clauses and provisions in the
agreement reflected the basic understanding of the parties that the pur-
chaser was buying assets and liabilities of a corporation as shown on a
specified balance sheet."49 In addition, the court found that the seller had
specifically retained liability for all of its then "known and anticipated
torts.' 50 But at the heart of the dispute was Section 5 of the Agreement.
Section 5(D) of the agreement identified liabilities being assumed by
Martin-Marietta as follows:
D. Except as provided below, as of the Closing Date, Wedron shall
assign to [Martin-Marietta] and [Martin-Marietta] shall assume all of
the obligations and liabilities of Wedron on the Closing Date
including:
142. Id. at 134 (citing TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN., art. 5.10 § (B)(2) (Vernon Supp.
2000)). The court also noted that Article 5.10(B)(1) eliminates the "de facto merger" doc-
trine, the third exception under the Restatement. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.10
§ (B)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2000). In Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755, 758-59
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals rejected the "mere continuation" theory, the fourth exception recognized by the Re-
statement, as contrary to the legislative intent of article 5.10(B). Lockheed, 16 S.W.3d at
135.
143. Lockheed, 16 S.W.3d at 135 n.6.
144. Id. at 135.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing TEX. Bus. CORP. Acir ANN., art. 5.10 § (B)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2000);
Mudgett, 709 S.W.2d at 758-59)). The court also noted that this expressed assumption re-
quirement had long been the law in Texas. Id. (citing Southwestern Gas, Light & Power
Co., v. Jay, 275 S.W. 735, 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1925, writ ref'd)).
147. Lockheed, 16 S.W.3d at 135.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 137.
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(i) The liabilities and obligations of Wedron on the Balance Sheet,
except to the effect such liabilities and obligations shall have been
discharged or satisfied prior to the Closing Date;
(ii) The liabilities and obligations of Wedron that have arisen in
the ordinary course of business prior to the Closing Date and Have
not been discharged or satisfied by Wedron prior to the Closing
Date;
(iii) The liabilities and obligations of Wedron under the pension
plans covering hourly employees, labor agreements, employment
contracts and future obligations in respect of Wedron's employees
set forth in Exhibits H and I;
(iv) The liabilities and obligations of Wedron under the Wedron
Silica Company Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees ("Sala-
ried Plan") in respect of the participants under such Plan as of the
Closing Date (other than those participants who terminated em-
ployment with Wedron prior to the Closing Date), it being under-
stood that such liabilities and obligations will be transferred in
accordance with the requirements of Federal law to a separate
pension plan to be maintained by Martin Marietta, as set forth in
Section ll.E; and
(v) The liabilities and obligations of Wedron under all leases of
real property, or mining claims described in Exhibits A-1 or A-2;
leases of equipment, machinery and tangible personal property de-
scribed in Exhibit B-i; material contracts, agreements and commit-
ments described in Exhibit D and any other agreements, contracts
and commitments entered into by Wedron in the ordinary course
of business;
provided, however, that [Martin-Marietta] shall not assume any
other material obligation or liability of Wedron (i) that does not ap-
pear on the Balance sheet, (ii) that has not been disclosed to [Mar-
tin-Marietta] under this Agreement, or (iii) to which [Martin-
Marietta] ha[s] not specifically consented in writing on or before the
Closing Date to assume as of the Closing Date.151
Lockheed maintained that, pursuant to Section 5(D) of the agreement,
Martin-Marietta assumed only limited liabilities related to the "day-to-
day operating" of the business being acquired, not "contingent tort liabili-
ties."152 The workers, relying on clause (ii) of Section 5(D), claimed that
their injuries were a "liability that Wedron incurred in the ordinary
course of its business of supplying sand to the foundries and that Martin-
Marietta, therefore, assumed that liability."'1 53 Lockheed argued that the
workers, by relying directly on clause (ii), were ignoring the qualification
to all of the specified clauses set forth in the introduction to Section 5(D),
i.e., the proviso that read: "Except as provided below, as of the Closing
Date. . ." and in the final proviso that followed the five specific clauses
which states:
151. Id. at 136-37.
152. Id. at 137.
153. Lockheed, 16 S.W.3d at 137.
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Provided, however, that [Martin-Marietta] shall not assume any
other material obligation or liability of Wedron (i) that does not ap-
pear on the Balance sheet, (ii) that has not been disclosed to [Mar-
tin-Marietta] under this Agreement, or (iii) to which [Martin-
Marietta] ha[s] not specifically consented in writing on or before the
Closing date to assume as of the Closing Date. 154
The workers countered that the last proviso only modified clause (v) of
Section 5(D), and not all of Section 5(D).155 The court rejected the work-
ers interpretation of the final proviso, concluding that such an interpreta-
tion would render "meaningless the introduction to Paragraph D."'
1 56
Rather, the court concluded that the final proviso modified all of the
clauses proceeding it.157
Under either the Maryland or Delaware "express or implied assump-
tion of liabilities" standard or the Texas "express assumption of liabili-
ties" standard, the court held that there was no assumption by Martin-
Marietta of liability for the contingent tort related to the workers' alleged
injuries.' 58 The only liabilities assumed by Martin-Marietta, according to
the court's reading of the agreement, were those that arose in the ordi-
nary course of business, which the court held not to include tort liabilities,
at least in the context of the specific agreement and the language of Sec-
tion 5(D). 159
154. Id.
155. Id. at 139.
156. Id. The court also noted that the final proviso "appears flush at the margin and
directly beneath the introduction to Paragraph D." Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Lockheed, 16 S.W.3d at 140.
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